WT3: THE KAZAKH INCURSION - WHAT’S THE STORY?

/// INTRODUCTION

The world has not yet reached a flashpoint where all out war is declared, and no one wants to be the one to cause it. It’s a game of cat and mouse, moves and counter moves. Special forces act beyond borders training and facilitating local militias and irregular groups, raiding key enemy locations or conducting false flag operations. Following the events of White Tiger 2, ODIN PMC discovered key intelligence showing ESS had been trained, supplied and funded by Chinese and Russian special forces, suggesting ESS was simply a pawn in a much larger geopolitical game. White Tiger 3 sees the focus return to the Millmerran region yet again, the Russian, Iranian and Chinese Coalition (RICC) have been steadily continuing to grow and enable both regular and irregular forces in the region to suit their agenda, posing a significant threat to NATO interests in the area.

Today, we set the stage for the story of White Tiger 3: The Kazakh Incursion. Where are we headed? Who’s going to be there? And what is my role in all of this? We hope that this brief discussion on the topic can help guide your mind in the right direction to fully immerse yourself in our experience.

/// SITUATION - LOCATION

The Millmerran region is a topographically simple area with mild lowlands, rarely holding water. It is a typically dry and densely wooded area, limiting vehicle access to local roads only. As a result, vehicle based operations are deemed ineffective as overt vehicle use is easily detected, and subsequent ambushes, vehicle checkpoints or blockades are likely. There are scattered defenses in the area, and a limited number of structures. The Millmerran region is located within Kazakhstan close to the border with Uzbekistan. Following the failed 2024 actions of the ODIN Private Military Company, Kazakhstan is sympathetic to RICC. Condemning the RICC, the Uzbek government has aligned with NATO bolstering their defences and posturing as a strong military force.

/// SITUATION - FORCES - RICC

The Russian, Iranian and Chinese Coalition (RICC) was found to be behind the funding and training of ESS forces in mid 2024 following an otherwise failed action by ODIN PMC in the Buccas region. Since this, RICC has been bolstering key military installations in southern Kazakhstan with personnel by conducting training and enabling missions with local forces. Millmerran is not the home of many of the fighters of RICC forces, but they still hold an advantage with members having trained and lived in the area for a significant period of time.

RICC Forces are a mixture of conventional RICC units along with trained militia, accompanying irregular saboteurs and special forces groups in the form of advisors and enablers. Known members of the ESS have been seen within the ranks of RICC, likely in search of their next big pay day.

There are reports of RICC Special Forces groups using Kazakh facilities as launching points, conducting raid actions over the Uzbekistan border within NATO aligned zones seeking to cause disruption and destabilisation. RICC seeks to continue to bolster the region in order to facilitate future operations of this style, preparing for a full scale invasion of the countries south of the border.

/// SITUATION - FORCES - NATO

Following the expulsion of ODIN PMC from the Kazakh region, NATO forces have arrived in the neighboring Uzbekistan. Publicly, NATO has been visibly conducting exercises in locations close to the Kazakhstan border. This is advertised as a show of force to RICC, at best a feint to encourage the enemy to back down. However, internally this is known to be a loud show to facilitate the covert infiltration of a small force into the Millmerran region.The Kazakh Incursion by NATO will be an unsupported raid action, with the combat team relying solely on organic assets to complete their mission. If compromised, NATO intends to claim they simply “got lost”, knowing RICC cannot refute this claim without exposing the nature of their own cross border operations.

This force is composed of a mixture of NATO Special Forces groups. Following their failure on Operation White Tiger 2 in mid 2024, ODIN suffered significant losses and as such have been relegated to a training and advising role of the local Uzbek Security Forces. Although organic assets are limited, human intelligence operators have been able to generate a moderate web of independent parties sympathetic to the NATO cause, resulting in some limited support in the form of auxiliary infiltration platforms, limited supply caches and trained fighters ready to fight RICC alongside NATO.

NATO seeks to raid key locations across the Kazakh border in order to destabilise RICC’s firm hold of the area and disrupt their ability to train and prepare for future warfare.

/// CONCLUSION

The large force concentration and extended training period of RICC training teams and their associated militias when compared to the professional nature of the NATO/ODIN/Auxiliary combat team suggests any future conflict will be evenly matched. The steady supply of RICC resources into the area will certainly result in a near-peer conflict between both sides, with any battle sure to be highly lethal. How long before such bloody cloak and dagger operations spill over to widespread international armed conflict?